Page record
Changelog.
EigenLayer is a set of smart contracts on Ethereum that lets people "restake" assets to secure other services [1]. Restaking means putting stake to work a second time: the same deposit backs extra services on top of its usual job. Stakers deposit native ETH, liquid staking tokens, the EIGEN token or other ERC-20 tokens [1].
That stake then backs services built outside EigenLayer itself, often running offchain, which EigenLayer calls Autonomous Verifiable Services (AVSs) [1][2]. EigenLayer's own docs call this a "marketplace for trust" [1].
The idea is that a new service does not have to build its own validator network and stake from scratch [1]. It can borrow security from stakers and operators already in EigenLayer [1]. In return, the service can pay rewards, and it can slash stake when operators break its rules [1].
Analogy, not the mechanism itself: it is like a new shop hiring guards from an established security firm instead of recruiting and training its own.
EigenLayer is developed by Eigen Labs [13], which now presents it as the base layer of a wider product line called EigenCloud [6][14]. Upgrades go through EigenLayer Improvement Proposals (ELIPs) and need approval from a Protocol Council [13]. This page covers the restaking protocol only.
Delegation is a "double opt-in": both staker and operator must agree [1].
Native ETH is restaked through an "EigenPod," a per-user contract that the staker points their Ethereum validator's withdrawal credentials at [2]. Withdrawal credentials say where a validator's ETH goes when it leaves staking, so pointing them at the pod puts that ETH under EigenLayer's rules.
Since the slashing upgrade, AVSs organize operators into "Operator Sets" [3][4]. An operator allocates a share of its delegated stake to a particular Operator Set, and that share becomes "Unique Stake" [2][3]. Only the AVS running that set can slash it [3][4]. ELIP-002 says this pairing guards each AVS "without creating exogenous risk to other AVSs or the protocol at large" [4].
Analogy, not the mechanism itself: it is like a contractor setting aside a separate deposit for each client, so one client can only claim from its own deposit.
Allocations and withdrawals are slowed by built-in delays [5][7]:
EigenLayer's docs call slashing "maximally flexible" [3]. AVSs can design their protocols "to slash for any reason," and slashing "does not have to be objectively attributable (that is, provable onchain)" [3]. The docs put the burden on participants: operators must understand each AVS's slashing rules before taking on its stake [3]. Stakers are responsible for watching where their operators allocate [8].
Slashed funds are handled one of two ways [3]:
The docs say plainly that "there is an incentive to slash user funds when redistribution is enabled" [9]. They also warn that compromised AVS or operator keys "can lead to theft of user funds rather than just burning" [9].
AVSs pay rewards to operators and stakers through a core contract called the RewardsCoordinator [1]. Separately, the protocol mints EIGEN to stakers and operators as "Programmatic Incentives" [6].
Duration Vaults, added by ELIP-015, lock deposits for a fixed period and allocate all of the stake to one Operator Set [10]. Stakers cannot withdraw until the period ends [10]. The vaults support liquid staking tokens and other ERC-20s, but not EIGEN or native ETH [10].
| Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Apr 17, 2025 | Slashing and Operator Sets live on mainnet (ELIP-002) | [11] |
| Jul 7, 2025 | Redistribution release v1.5.0 published (ELIP-006) | [12] |
| Mar 24, 2026 | Release v1.12.0: Duration Vaults (ELIP-015), Rewards 2.2 | [12] |
| May 20, 2026 | ELIP-016 (redistribution delay) proposed | [15] |
| Jun 15, 2026 | Protocol Council approves ELIP-016 and ELIP-017 | [16] |
| Jun 25, 2026 | Release v1.13.0 published, with slash resolution delay | [12] |
| Jul 10, 2026 | ELIP-018 (RETIRE) drafted | [18] |
| Aug 28, 2026 | ELIP-019 accounting fix reported shipped (v1.13.1) | [17][20] |
What changed. On April 17, 2025, Eigen Labs said slashing was live on mainnet and called it the protocol's "feature-complete" milestone [11]. Redistribution followed under ELIP-006, which the docs now describe as available on mainnet [5][12].
Why it mattered. From then on, AVSs could penalize operators' stake for breaking their rules, and stakers carried that risk [1][3].
What changed. ELIP-016 added a seven-day (50,400-block) delay between a slash and the release of slashed funds [5][15]. It also added a switch that lets the pauser multisig halt burning and redistribution [15]. The proposal explained why. Some operators, including public ones, had set their allocation delay to zero [15]. Some operators that had stopped running "still have assets delegated to them," which raised questions about their keys [15]. Before the change, a compromised operator with no allocation delay could have had its delegated assets "instantaneously allocated and redistributed out of EigenLayer" [15]. The proposal said there was "presently no evidence" this had happened [15]. The Protocol Council approved it on June 15, 2026, noting "recent high profile security incidents" [16].
Why it mattered. Slashed funds can no longer move instantly, which gives time to respond, including a pause, if a compromised operator is used as the proposal described [15].
What changed. ELIP-019 fixed a rounding mismatch that could over-count slashable shares in the withdrawal queue [17]. Eigen Labs described the effect as "dust-sized" on any single slash, but called it "the seed of a theoretical attack on strategy solvency" [17]. The fix shipped as v1.13.1 [17][20], and the write-up was posted on August 28, 2026 [17].
Why it mattered. It removed what Eigen Labs called the seed of a theoretical attack [17].
What changed. ELIP-018, still a draft, proposes a one-way "retirement" path for EigenPods [18]. Its motivation is that pod owners currently have no way to rotate the keys that control their validators [18].
Why it matters. Nothing has changed yet; it is a draft [18].
An AVS can slash "for any reason," without onchain proof [3]. The docs put the main responsibility on stakers: choose operators carefully and keep monitoring their allocations [3][8]. The protocol's own safeguards are its delays, including each operator's allocation delay, and since ELIP-016 a seven-day wait and a pause before slashed funds move [5][9][15].
Redistribution turns a key compromise into possible theft, in the docs' own words [9]. ELIP-016 adds a delay and a pause, but the proposal says it includes "no mechanism… to allow an erroneous slashing event to be reverted" [15]. Slashed funds would stay frozen "until protocol upgrades capable of handling the malicious slashing event are completed" [15].
The Protocol Council approves and executes upgrades through a timelock [13]. A pauser multisig can halt redistribution [15]. "At this time," only Eigen Labs formally creates and submits ELIPs [13]. How and when that opens up is not stated.
ELIP-016 says some operators set zero allocation delays and some inactive operators still hold delegations [15]. Le Coin has not measured how many, and the proposal does not say.
Multichain verification, which lets AVS results be checked on other chains, is labeled early-access and "in active development" [19]. Redistribution of native ETH and EIGEN is "not yet" supported [9]. The RETIRE exit path is a draft [18].
By Learning Hub policy, this dive carries no price, market value, deposit totals or reward-rate figures. Those go stale, and News covers them.
0x54fd4d50 (version()), to DelegationManager proxy 0x39053D51B77DC0d36036Fc1fCc8Cb819df8Ef37A, at block height 26,134,945 (block hash 0xa5af3e8e18eb505fb67bc2d825bc581de4406b8b66017700b771a819aeaa1664, 2026-10-06 17:52:11 UTC, 1:52:11 p.m. ET); returned "1.13.1". Explorer cross-check: Blockscout (https://eth.blockscout.com/address/0x39053D51B77DC0d36036Fc1fCc8Cb819df8Ef37A) identifies the address as a proxy whose implementation is DelegationManager; the address matches the mainnet deployment list in the eigenlayer-contracts README.Not financial advice.